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In the emerging Internet of Things (IoT), lightweight public key cryptography plays an essential role in security and privacy
protection. With the approach of quantum computing era, it is important to design and evaluate lightweight quantum-resistant
cryptographic algorithms applicable to IoT. LWE-based cryptography is a widely used and well-studied family of postquantum
cryptographic constructions whose hardness is based on worst-case lattice problems. To make LWE friendly to resource-
constrained IoT devices, a variant of LWE, named Compact-LWE, was proposed and used to design lightweight cryptographic
schemes. In this paper, we study the so-called Compact-LWE problem and clarify that under certain parameter settings it can
be solved in polynomial time. As a consequence, our result leads to a practical attack against an instantiated scheme based on
Compact-LWE proposed by Liu et al. in 2017.
1. Introduction
The Internet is changing from a network of conventional
computers to a network of smart objects, that is, “things,”
including vehicles, electronics, implantable medical devices,
and sensors. The trend of Internet of Things (IoT) makes
the Internet more ubiquitous, but it simultaneously brings
a series of challenges, such as monitoring [1], communica-
tion [2], and management [3]. Among all these challenges,
security [4–6] is currently listed as a top concern. As the
theoretical basis, cryptographic algorithms play a key role in
achieving data confidentiality and integrity, authentication,
and other security needs in IoT.
Currently, RSA and ECC cryptosystems have been imple-
mented efficiently on resource-constrained devices [7, 8],
which provides desirable security for IoT applications. How-
ever, these public key schemes are based on integer factor-
ization or discrete logarithms, which are fragile under quan-
tum cryptanalysis. To defense quantum attacks, NIST has
launched the postquantum cryptography standardization.
Lattice-based cryptography is viewed as a very promising
postquantum alternative to classical cryptography due to its
strong security guarantee, great performance and powerful
functionality. It is becoming increasingly important to design
and evaluate practical schemes based on well-studied lattice
problems.
The Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, introduced by
Regev [9], is one of the most popular lattice problems for
cryptographic applications [10–13]. An LWE instance consists
of a random matrix A ∈ Z𝑚×𝑛𝑞 and a vector b = As +
e mod 𝑞, where the secret s ∈ Z𝑛𝑞 and the error e ∈
Z𝑚 are sampled from a certain distribution. The decision
LWE problem is to distinguish the distribution of LWE
instances from the uniform distribution over Z𝑚×𝑛𝑞 × Z𝑚𝑞 ,
while the search version is to recover the secret s from LWE
instances. In [9], the average-case LWE is proved as hard as
certain worst-case lattice problems, which provides a solid
theoretical grounding for LWE-based schemes.
However, LWE-based schemes are usually not efficient
in practice. It seems infeasible to apply regular LWE-based
cryptographic constructions to IoT directly, due to the
constrained computing environments of smart devices. Thus
it is critical to refine existing algorithms or develop newLWE-
based cryptographic schemes for security protection using
limited resources. So far, there are mainly two optimization
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strategies: (1) introducing extra algebraic structures and (2)
reducing the sizes of matrix or vector elements. Following
the first one, some LWE variants, such as Ring-LWE [14]
and Module-LWE [15], were developed and led to many
practical schemes [16–18] and efficient implementations [19,
20]. Following the second strategy, some variants were
proposed as well, including LWE with short secret or error
[21–23] and LWEwith compact matrix [24, 25].Then, related
cryptanalyses [26–29] provided concrete security estimations
for the schemes based on these variants.
A recent instantiation of LWE-based encryption scheme
with particularly aggressive parameter was proposed by Liu
et al. [25] and presented as an invited talk at ACISP 2017
conference. The scheme is based on the so-called Compact-
LWE and designed especially for resource-constrained IoT
devices. As shownby experimental results, the scheme indeed
achieves an excellent performance on small IoT devices.
Subsequently, Bootle and Tibouchi gave a cryptanalysis of
this scheme [29] by recovering the nonce in the encryption
process with the help of lattice embedding technique. They
pointed out that the security level was much lower than [25]
claimed.
We took an insight into the Compact-LWE problem,
an LWE variant with the random A selected from a small
range, and discovered that two 𝑞-ary lattices defined by A
have reduced bases of special patterns. We proved that the
Compact-LWE problem can be solved in polynomial time
under certain parameters, which is applied to analyze two
concrete lightweight public key schemes proposed in [24, 25],
respectively. We failed to attack the scheme of [24] due to
itsmoderate parameters and successfully recovered plaintexts
with 100% probability and within a very short time for the
encryption scheme in [25]. Compared with the attack against
the scheme of [25] in [29], our attack follows a different
method and can be used to analyze general cryptographic
constructions based on this kind of LWE variant.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall
some notations and basic facts used in our discussion. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce Compact-LWE and present our analysis.
We describe a concrete attack against related Compact-LWE-
based schemes in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notations. For any positive integer 𝑞, we identifyZ𝑞 with
the set {0, . . . , 𝑞 − 1}. We denote by [𝑥]𝑞 the remainder of𝑥 divided by 𝑞 in Z𝑞 and by [𝑥]𝑞 the remainder in{−⌈𝑞/2⌉, . . . , 𝑞 − 1 − ⌈𝑞/2⌉}. Let ⟨⋅, ⋅⟩ and ‖ ⋅ ‖ be the Euclidean
inner product and norm, respectively. The elements of R𝑚
are viewed as column vectors. For any point t ∈ R𝑚 and𝑟 > 0, we denote byB𝑚(t, 𝑟) the𝑚-dimensional ball of radius𝑟 centered at t.
2.2. Probability and Statistics. Let 𝜒 be a distribution over a
discrete domain 𝐸. We write𝑋 ←󳨄 𝜒 to represent the random
variable𝑋 that is sampled from the distribution 𝜒. For a finite
domain 𝐸, we denote by 𝑈(𝐸) the uniform distribution over𝐸.
A function 𝑓(𝑛) is negligible, if 𝑓(𝑛) = 𝑜(𝑛−𝑐) for
every fixed constant 𝑐. We generally denote by negl(𝑛) as a
negligible functionwith respect to 𝑛.We say that a probability
is overwhelming if it is 1 − negl(𝑛), and a probability is
nonnegligible if it is 𝜔(𝑛−𝑐) for some constant 𝑐.
Definition 1. Given a distribution 𝜒 overQ𝑚, we say that 𝜒 is(𝛼, 𝛽)-confidence with respect to 𝜆, if Pr[‖𝑋‖ ≥ 𝛼] ≤ negl(𝜆)
and Pr[‖𝑋‖ ≤ 𝛽] ≥ 1/poly(𝜆) for𝑋 ←󳨄 𝜒.
The parameter 𝛼 describes an overwhelming confidence
interval for 𝜒 with respect to 𝜆, while 𝛽 describes a nonneg-
ligible confidence interval.
2.3. Lattices. A lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of
R𝑚 and generated by a set of linearly independent vectors
b1, . . . , b𝑛, that is, L = {∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖b𝑖 | 𝑥𝑖 ∈ Z for any 𝑖}. We
call B = (b1, . . . , b𝑛) ∈ R𝑚×𝑛 a basis of L and write L
as L(b1, . . . , b𝑛) or L(B). The integer 𝑛 is called the rank
of L. For any unimodular matrix U ∈ Z𝑛×𝑛, BU is also a
basis ofL. The span ofL, denoted by span(L), is the linear
space spanned by its basis. The first minimum of a latticeL
is defined as 𝜆1(L) fl mink∈L\{0}‖k‖.
We denote by B∗ = (b∗1 , . . . , b∗𝑛 ) the Gram-Schmidt
orthogonalization of B where b∗𝑖 = b𝑖 − ∑𝑖−1𝑗=1 𝜇𝑖,𝑗b∗𝑗 and 𝜇𝑖,𝑗 =⟨b𝑖, b∗𝑗 ⟩/⟨b∗𝑗 , b∗𝑗 ⟩. The volume of L is defined as vol(L) =∏𝑛𝑖=1‖b∗𝑖 ‖ that is an invariant of L and independent of the
choice of the basis.
The dual lattice of L is L∗ fl {y ∈ span(L) |⟨x, y⟩ ∈ Z, ∀x ∈ L}. If B is a basis of L, it is
known that D = B(B𝑇B)−𝑇 is a basis of L∗. Furthermore,
we have the following relation between the Gram-Schmidt
orthogonalization of a basis and its dual.
Lemma 2. Let (b1, . . . , b𝑛) be an ordered basis of lattice
L and (d1, . . . , d𝑛) be its dual basis in reverse order (i.e.,⟨d𝑖, b𝑗⟩ = 𝛿𝑖,𝑛+1−𝑗 where 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 denotes Kronecker delta). Then
d∗𝑖 = b∗𝑛+1−𝑖/‖b∗𝑛+1−𝑖‖2 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛.
Given a latticeL and a “reasonable” subset𝐾 of span(L),
Gaussian heuristic says that the number of points in 𝐾 ∩L
is approximately vol(𝐾)/vol(L). FromGaussian heuristic, we
would expect that𝜆1(L) ≈ vol(L)1/𝑛 ⋅GH(𝑛)whereGH(𝑛) =
vol(B𝑛(0, 1))−1/𝑛 ≈ √𝑛/2𝜋𝑒.
Lattice reduction is a powerful tool for cryptanalysis.
LLL, invented by Lenstra et al. [30], is the first polynomial
time lattice reduction algorithm. We now recall this classical
reduction. For a detailed introduction, we refer to [31].
Definition 3 (LLL reduced basis). A basis B = (b1, . . . , b𝑛)
is a 𝛿-LLL reduced basis with 𝛿 ∈ (1/2, 1) if the following
conditions hold:
(1) Size Reduced: |𝜇𝑖,𝑗| ≤ 1/2 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛.
(2) Lova´sz Condition: 𝛿‖b∗𝑖 ‖ ≤ ‖b∗𝑖+1 + 𝜇𝑖+1,𝑖b∗𝑖 ‖ for 1 ≤𝑖 < 𝑛.
Then we immediately get the following property of LLL
reduced bases.
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Lemma 4. Let (b1, . . . , b𝑛) be a 𝛿-LLL reduced basis. For any1 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, then
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩b∗𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 ≥ 𝛾𝑗−𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩b∗𝑗 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 , (1)
where 𝛾 = 1/√𝛿2 − 1/4.
3. Compact-LWE and Its Weak Instances
In this section, we will introduce an LWE variant named
Compact-LWE and report on an attack against certain
Compact-LWE instances. A formal definition of Compact-
LWE is given as follows.
Definition 5. Let 𝑞, 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑏 be positive integers and 𝜒 be
a distribution over Z𝑚. Given s ←󳨄 𝑈(Z𝑛𝑞), the Compact-
LWE𝑞,𝑚,𝑛,𝑏,𝜒 problem is to recover s from (A, b = As + e mod𝑞) where A←󳨄 𝑈(Z𝑚×𝑛𝑏 ) and e←󳨄 𝜒.
Compared with classical LWE, the sizes of elements
of A, namely 𝑏, can be less than the modulus 𝑞. Thanks
to this modification, Compact-LWE-based schemes are of
smaller public key sizes and better efficiency than original
LWE-based schemes. Thus Compact-LWE seems friendly to
lightweight cryptography and constrained devices.
3.1. Structures of 𝑞-Ary Lattices in Compact-LWE. We intro-
duce two𝑚-dimensional 𝑞-ary lattices which are widely used
in the cryptanalysis of LWE. The first lattice, denoted by
L𝑞(A), is generated by the columns ofA and 𝑞⋅I𝑚 and defined
as
L𝑞 (A)
fl {x ∈ Z𝑚 | x = Ay mod 𝑞 for some y ∈ Z𝑛} , (2)
The second lattice L⊥𝑞 (A) is formed by all integer vectors
“orthogonal” (modulo 𝑞) to the columns of A, which is
L
⊥
𝑞 (A) fl {x ∈ Z𝑚 | A𝑇x = 0 mod 𝑞} . (3)
As shown in [10], these two lattices are duals scaled by a
factor:
L
⊥
𝑞 (A) = 𝑞 ⋅L𝑞 (A)∗ . (4)
By running LLL algorithmwith input (A | 𝑞 ⋅ I𝑚), one can
obtain a basis ofL𝑞(A). ForA in the compact setting, the LLL
reduced basis is of a special structure.
Lemma 6. Let A ∈ Z𝑚×𝑛𝑏 where 𝑚 ≥ 𝑛 + 2𝜋𝑒 and 𝑏 ≤𝑞(𝑚−𝑛)/𝑚/√𝑚. Let B = (b1, . . . , b𝑚) be the basis of L𝑞(A)
obtained by running LLL with parameter 𝛿 on (A | 𝑞 ⋅ I𝑚).
Under Gaussian heuristic, then, for 𝛾 = 1/√𝛿2 − 1/4,
(1) L(b1, . . . , b𝑛) = L(A) and ‖b∗𝑖 ‖ ≤ 𝑏√𝑚 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤𝑛;
(2) ‖b∗𝑖 ‖ > 𝑞𝛾𝑛−𝑖+1(𝑏√𝑚)−𝑛/(𝑚−𝑛) for 𝑛 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚.
Proof. Let 𝜙 : Z𝑚/L⊥𝑞 (A) → Z𝑛𝑞 be the homomorphism
mapping k +L⊥𝑞 (A) to A𝑇k mod 𝑞. It can be verified that 𝜙
is injective, then we have
vol (L⊥𝑞 (A)) ≤ 𝑞𝑛. (5)
Together with (4), it follows that
vol (L𝑞 (A)) ≥ 𝑞𝑚−𝑛. (6)
Let 𝜋A(⋅) denote the projection to the orthogonal com-
plement of span(A). Considering the projected lattice L󸀠
generated by 𝜋A(𝑞 ⋅ I𝑚), the dimension of L󸀠 is (𝑚 − 𝑛).
Combined with (6), we have
vol (L󸀠) ≥ vol (L𝑞 (A))
vol (L (A)) ≥ 𝑞
𝑚−𝑛
vol (L (A)) . (7)
Since vol(L(A)) = ∏𝑛𝑖=1‖a∗𝑖 ‖ ≤ ∏𝑛𝑖=1‖a𝑖‖ ≤ (𝑏√𝑚)𝑛, it
follows that
vol (L󸀠) ≥ 𝑞𝑚−𝑛(𝑏√𝑚)𝑛 . (8)
By Gaussian heuristic, we have that
𝜆1 (L󸀠) ≈ √𝑚 − 𝑛2𝜋𝑒 ⋅ (vol (L󸀠))1/(𝑚−𝑛)
≥ 𝑞 ⋅ (𝑏√𝑚)−𝑛/(𝑚−𝑛) .
(9)
A straightforward computation leads to that 𝜆1(L󸀠) ≥𝑏√𝑚 ≥ max𝑛𝑖=1‖a∗𝑖 ‖. It is known that the maximum of the
Gram-Schmidt norms would never increase in LLL algo-
rithm. Thus, Lova´sz condition always holds for the 𝑛th and(𝑛+1)th vectors during LLL, whichmeans that these two vec-
tors would never be swapped. In otherwords, running LLL on(A | 𝑞 ⋅ I𝑚) is equivalent to running LLL onA and 𝜋A(𝑞 ⋅ I𝑚),
respectively. Consequently, we have L(b1, . . . , b𝑛) = L(A)
and ‖b∗𝑖 ‖ ≤ max𝑛𝑖=1‖a∗𝑖 ‖ ≤ 𝑏√𝑚 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛.
For the second inequality, Lemma 4 yields that
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩b∗𝑛+𝑖󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 ≥ 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩b∗𝑛+1󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 𝛾1−𝑖 > 𝑞𝛾1−𝑖 (𝑏√𝑚)−𝑛/(𝑚−𝑛) , (10)
because ‖b∗𝑛+1‖ ≥ 𝜆1(L󸀠). We now complete the proof.
Remark 7. Experimental results coincide with Lemma 6.
Under parameter settings (𝑞,𝑚, 𝑛) = (220, 300, 120), we gen-
erated 20 instances for each 𝑏 ranging from 2 to 218. Figure 1
illustrates the average profile of B, where the first 𝑛 b∗𝑖 ’s are
relatively short when 𝑏 is small. We notice that the slope of{log2‖b∗𝑖 ‖}𝑚𝑖=𝑛+1 is less than the theoretical bound log2𝛾 ≈0.2172, which can be explained by the better performance
of LLL in practice than the theoretical prediction. Figure 2
shows the gap between ‖b∗𝑛+1‖ and ‖b∗𝑛‖, which is narrowing
as 𝑏 increases. It is worth noting that when 𝑏 < 𝑞𝑚/(𝑚−𝑛)/√𝑚
(the bound in Lemma 6 marked by the dashed line), the gap
is quite significant.
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Figure 2: Experimental measure of the gap between log2‖b∗𝑛‖ and
log2‖b∗𝑛+1‖.
Lemma 8. Let 𝑚 ≥ 𝑛 + 2𝜋𝑒 and 𝑏 ≤ 𝑞(𝑚−𝑛)/𝑚/√𝑚. Let A ∈
Z𝑚×𝑛𝑏 and 𝛿 ∈ (1/2, 1). There exists a basis ofL⊥𝑞 (A), denoted
by D = (d1, . . . , d𝑚), satisfying the following conditions under
Gaussian heuristic:
(1) L(d1, . . . , d𝑚−𝑛) = {x ∈ Z𝑚 | x𝑇A = 0},
(2) ‖d𝑖‖ ≤ √(𝑖 + 3)/4⋅𝛾𝑚−𝑛(𝑏√𝑚)𝑛/(𝑚−𝑛) for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚−𝑛,
(3) ‖d𝑖‖ ≥ √𝑛/2𝜋𝑒(𝑞/𝑏√𝑚) for𝑚 − 𝑛 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚,
where 𝛾 = 1/√𝛿2 − 1/4. This basis can be obtained in
polynomial time.
Proof. Let B = (B1 | B2) be the LLL reduced basis ofL𝑞(A)
defined in Lemma 6 whereL(B1) =L(A). LetU be amatrix
such that U𝑇B = 𝑞I𝑚. Then, from (4), U is a basis ofL⊥𝑞 (A).
Let U = (U1 | U2) = (u𝑚, . . . , u1) where U1 ∈ Z𝑚×𝑛.
Let L⊥(A) = {x ∈ Z𝑚 | x𝑇A = 0}. We claim that
L(U2) =L⊥(A). It is easy to observe thatL⊥(A) =L⊥(B1)
whereL⊥(B1) = {x ∈ Z𝑚 | x𝑇B1 = 0}. On one hand, we have
L(U2) ⊆ L⊥(B1) since U𝑇2B1 = 0. On the other hand, for
arbitrary k ∈ L⊥(B1) ⊆ L⊥𝑞 (A), there exists a unique vector
pair (z1, z2) such that k = U1z1 +U2z2. SinceU𝑇1B1 = 𝑞I𝑛, we
have k𝑇B1 = 𝑞z𝑇1 = 0 and then k ∈L(U2).Therefore, it holds
thatL(U2) =L⊥(A).
We run size reduction algorithm on (u1, . . . , u𝑚) (vectors
of U in reverse order) and obtain a new basis of L⊥𝑞 (A),
denoted by D = (d1, . . . , d𝑚). Size reduction can be done
within polynomial time; thus it suffices to prove the last two
conditions hold for D. From Lemmas 2 and 6, we have that,
for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑚 − 𝑛,󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩d∗𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 = 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩u∗𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 = 𝑞󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩b∗𝑚+1−𝑖󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 ≤ 𝛾𝑚−𝑛−𝑖 (𝑏√𝑚)𝑛/(𝑚−𝑛) , (11)
and then
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩d𝑖󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 ≤ √󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩d∗𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2 + 14
𝑖−1∑
𝑗=1
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩d∗𝑗 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2
≤ √ 𝑖 + 34 𝛾𝑚−𝑛 (𝑏√𝑚)𝑛/(𝑚−𝑛) .
(12)
Let L󸀠󸀠 = L(𝜋𝑚−𝑛(d𝑚−𝑛+1), . . . ,𝜋𝑚−𝑛(d𝑚)) where
𝜋𝑚−𝑛(⋅) is the projection to the orthogonal complement of
span(d1, . . . , d𝑚−𝑛). Observing that vol(L𝑞(A))vol(L⊥𝑞 (A)) =𝑞𝑚 and ‖d∗𝑖 ‖ = 𝑞/‖b∗𝑚+1−𝑖‖ for 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 − 𝑛, together with
Lemma 6, we have
vol (L󸀠󸀠) = vol (L⊥𝑞 (A))∏𝑚−𝑛𝑖=1 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩d∗𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 =
𝑞𝑛∏𝑛𝑖=1 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩b∗𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 ≥
𝑞𝑛(𝑏√𝑚)𝑛 . (13)
On the basis of Gaussian heuristic, we conclude that, for𝑚−𝑛 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚,
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩d𝑖󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 ≥ 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩𝜋𝑚−𝑛 (d𝑖)󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 ≥ 𝜆1 (L󸀠󸀠) ≥ √ 𝑛2𝜋𝑒 𝑞𝑏√𝑚. (14)
We now complete the proof.
Remark 9. We ran experiments under parameters (𝑞,𝑚, 𝑛) =(220, 300, 120) and tested 20 instances for each 𝑏 ranging from2 to 218. Figure 3 provides a geometric intuition of D. There
also exists a large gap between ‖d𝑚−𝑛‖ and ‖d𝑚−𝑛+1‖ when 𝑏
is small. As illustrated in Figure 4, the gap between ‖d𝑚−𝑛‖
and ‖d𝑚−𝑛+1‖ is shrinking as 𝑏 grows. However, when 𝑏 <𝑞𝑚−𝑛/𝑚/√𝑚 (marked by the dashed line), the length of d𝑚−𝑛
is far less than 𝑞.
3.2. Attack Against Weak Compact-LWE Instances. Figure 1
illustrates a staircase-shaped profile of the basis of L𝑞(A).
Exploiting this feature, we can prove that it is possible to
efficiently recover a candidate error whose norm is close to
that of the original error for certain parameters.The following
lemma will be used in the later discussion.
Lemma 10. Let L ⊆ R𝑚 be a lattice of rank 𝑛 and B be a
basis of L. Let t ∈ R𝑚 and dist(t,L) = mink∈L‖t − k‖. If
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dist(t,L) ≤ 𝑟 < (1/2)min𝑛𝑖=1‖b∗𝑖 ‖, then there exists a unique
vector inB(t, 𝑟) ∩L.
Proof. Wedenote by k = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 V𝑖b𝑖 the vector output by Babai’s
nearest plane algorithm [32] on the latticeL and target vector
t. Assume, by contradiction, that k󸀠 ̸= k is another vector in
B(t, 𝑟) ∩L and k󸀠 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 V󸀠𝑖b𝑖. Let 𝑘 be the largest index such
that V𝑘 ̸= V󸀠𝑘. According to the process of Babai’s algorithm,
we conclude that
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩k󸀠 − t󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 ≥ 12 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩b∗𝑘󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 > 𝑟, (15)
which implies a contradiction.
Next we demonstrate a class of provably weak instances
of Compact-LWE and also an attack aiming at them.
Theorem 11. Let 𝑞, 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑏, 𝑟 be positive integers sat-
isfying 𝑏 ≤ 𝑞(𝑚−𝑛)/𝑚/√𝑚 and (√𝑚𝑛/2)𝑏 < 𝑟 ≤ (𝑞/2)𝛾𝑛−𝑚+1(𝑏√𝑚)−𝑛/(𝑚−𝑛) where 𝛾 = 1/√𝛿2 − 1/4 for 𝛿 ∈(1/2, 1) and a constant 𝑐 > 0. Let 𝜒 be a (𝑟, (1/2)√4𝑟2 − 𝑚𝑛𝑏2)-confidence distribution. Under Gaussian heu-
ristic, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
solving Compact-LWE𝑞,𝑚,𝑛,𝑏,𝜒.
Proof. Given a random sample (A, b = As + e mod 𝑞), we
can obtain a basis of L𝑞(A), denoted by B, by applying
LLL algorithm with parameter 𝛿 on (A | 𝑞I𝑚). Exploiting
Babai’s algorithm on L𝑞(A) and target vector b, we get a
pair of solution (s󸀠, e󸀠). We are to prove that (s󸀠, e󸀠) is legal
for Compact-LWE, that is, ‖e󸀠‖ ≤ 𝑟, with nonnegligible
probability.
From Lemma 6, we get that 𝑟 < (1/2)‖b∗𝑖 ‖ for 𝑛 + 1 ≤𝑖 ≤ 𝑚. We denote by 𝜋𝑛(⋅) the projection to the orthogonal
complement of span(b1, . . . , b𝑛). Let L󸀠 = 𝜋𝑛(L) and b󸀠 =
𝜋𝑛(b). Lemma 10 shows that there exists a unique vector in
B(b󸀠, 𝑟) ∩L󸀠, namely, 𝜋𝑛(e) = 𝜋𝑛(e󸀠). Then we have
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩e󸀠󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2 = 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩e󸀠 − 𝜋𝑛 (e󸀠)󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2 + 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩𝜋𝑛 (e󸀠)󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2
≤ 14
𝑛∑
𝑖=1
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩b∗𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2 + ‖e‖2 ≤ 𝑚𝑛𝑏24 + ‖e‖2 .
(16)
Since 𝜒 is (𝑟, (1/2)√4𝑟2 − 𝑚𝑛𝑏2)-confidence, it implies that‖e‖ ≤ (1/2)√4𝑟2 − 𝑚𝑛𝑏2 with nonnegligible probability.Thus
the probability of ‖e󸀠‖ ≤ 𝑟 is nonnegligible.
Remark 12. In such weak instances, it can be verified that
𝑞 > √𝑛 ⋅ 𝛾𝑚−𝑛−1 (𝑏√𝑚)𝑚/(𝑚−𝑛) , (17)
and thus parameters are overstretched [33, 34]. The inequali-
ties given in Lemma 6 follow the worst-case result of LLL, but
LLL behaves much better in practice. Hence our attack may
apply to more Compact-LWE instances. Moreover, note that,
for usual LWE distribution 𝜒 such as discrete Gaussian, it is
easy to set 𝛼, 𝛽 such that 𝜒 is (𝛼, 𝛽)-confidence.
4. Attack against
Compact-LWE-Based Schemes
In this section, our analysis of Section 3 is applied to
attack concrete Compact-LWE-based lightweight encryption
schemes. We successfully recover the plaintexts in IoT-
oriented public key encryption proposed by Liu et al. in [25]
following a totally different way with [29]. However, we fail
to give an effective cryptanalysis of the binary LWE-based
lightweight encryption in [24].
4.1. Liu et al.’s Compact-LWE-Based Scheme. Firstly, we briefly
recall the public key encryption in [25]. The scheme is
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specified by a tuple of public parameters (𝑞, 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑤, 𝑏)
satisfying
𝑛 + 1 < 𝑚 < 𝑛2,
2 log2𝑏 < 𝑛 < 𝑏,
(2𝑏 log2𝑏 + 2) ⋅ 𝑏 < 𝑞.
(18)
We list below three main algorithms: key generation Gen,
encryption Enc(⋅), and decryptionDec(⋅).
(i) Gen: sample s ←󳨄 𝑈(Z𝑛𝑞), and choose 𝑠𝑘, 𝑟, 𝑝 from
Z𝑞 satisfying
𝑡 ≤ 𝑝,
𝑏 < 𝑟,
𝑠𝑘 (𝑡 − 1) + 𝑤𝑟𝑝 < 𝑞,
(19)
and 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝, 𝑞 are pairwise coprime. Sample A ←󳨄𝑈(Z𝑚×𝑛𝑏 ) and e ←󳨄 𝑈(Z𝑚𝑟 ). Let 𝑠𝑘−1𝑞 ∈ Z𝑞 such that𝑠𝑘 ⋅ 𝑠𝑘−1𝑞 = 1 mod 𝑞. Output SK = (s, 𝑠𝑘, 𝑟, 𝑝) as the
secret key and PK = (A, pk = As− 𝑠𝑘−1𝑞 ⋅ 𝑝 ⋅ e mod 𝑞)
as the public key.
(ii) Enc(V ∈ Z𝑡,PK): uniformly and independently
sample 𝑖1, . . . , 𝑖𝑤 ←󳨄 𝑈(Z𝑚), and calculate c󸀠 =∑𝑤𝑗=1(a𝑖𝑗 , 𝑝𝑘𝑖𝑗) mod 𝑞 where (a𝑖, 𝑝𝑘𝑖) is the 𝑖th row of
PK. Let c󸀠 = (a, 𝑝𝑘), output c = (a, V − 𝑝𝑘 mod 𝑞) as
the ciphertext.
(iii) Dec(c = (a, 𝑥), SK): calculate 𝑐 = ⟨a, s⟩ + 𝑥 mod 𝑞
and then calculate 𝑠𝑘V = 𝑠𝑘 ⋅ 𝑐 mod 𝑞. Let 𝑠𝑘−1𝑝 be
the multiplicative inverse of 𝑠𝑘modulo 𝑝. Output the
plaintext V = [𝑠𝑘−1𝑝 ⋅ 𝑠𝑘V]𝑝.
In [25], the authors also proposed concrete parameters to
instantiate the scheme. The parameters are listed as follows:
(i) Public parameters: (𝑞, 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑤, 𝑏) = (232, 13, 74, 216,86, 16)
(ii) Secret parameters: (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝, 𝑟) = (2𝑥+1, 𝑡+2𝑦+1, ≤ (𝑞−1−𝑠𝑘⋅(𝑡−1))/(𝑤⋅𝑝))where (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ [0, 50]×[0, 500] or[0, 500] × [0, 50].
4.2. Attack against Liu et al.’s Scheme. According to the
average profile of bases shown in Lemmas 6 and 8 under the
parameters (𝑞,𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑏) = (232, 74, 13, 16) (see Figures 5 and 6)
as suggested in [25], it seems that Liu et al.’s scheme is fragile.
We propose a new attack against Liu et al.’s scheme with the
help of our analysis towards Compact-LWE in Section 3.
Our attack consists of two steps: guessing the mask coeffi-
cient (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) and recovering the plaintext. In the first step, one
can almost determine the pair (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) (sometimes together
with several possible candidate pairs) by enumerating and
checking. In the second step, combined with (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝), one can
calculate a pair of legal solution (s󸀠, e󸀠) to the Compact-LWE
problem and recover the plaintext as well. Nowwe are to show
the details of our attack.
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Step 1 (guessing themask coefficient (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝)). Firstly, we prove
that it is possible to recover efficiently the secret parameters𝑠𝑘 and 𝑝 only from the public key PK = (A, pk).
Let D = (d1, . . . , d𝑛) be a basis ofL⊥𝑞 (A) as described in
Lemma 4 with 𝛿 = √0.99. Let 𝑝−1𝑞 ∈ Z such that 𝑝−1𝑞 ⋅ 𝑝 =1 mod 𝑞; then we have that
𝑠𝑘 ⋅ 𝑝−1𝑞 ⋅ ⟨d𝑖, pk⟩ = − ⟨d𝑖, e⟩ mod 𝑞. (20)
Since ‖e‖ ≤ 𝑟√𝑚 ≤ (𝑞 − 1− 𝑠𝑘 ⋅ (𝑡 − 1))/(𝑤 ⋅ 𝑝)√𝑚 and ‖d𝑖‖ is
also small when 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 − 𝑛, a routine computation yields
that |⟨d𝑖, e⟩| ≤ ‖d𝑖‖ ⋅ ‖e‖ < 𝑞/2 under the parameter setting
suggested in [25]. Then it holds that
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨⌊𝑠𝑘 ⋅ 𝑝−1𝑞 ⋅ ⟨d𝑖, pk⟩⌉𝑞󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 = 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨⟨d𝑖, e⟩󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
≤ 𝑞 − 1 − 𝑠𝑘 ⋅ (𝑡 − 1)𝑤 ⋅ 𝑝 √𝑚 ⋅ 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩d𝑖󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩 ,
(21)
for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑚−𝑛. We try all possible pairs (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) ∈ {2𝑥+1 |𝑥 ∈ [0, 50] ∩ Z} × {𝑡 + 2𝑦 + 1 | 𝑦 ∈ [0, 500] ∩ Z} and check
inequality (21) for d1, . . . , d𝑚−𝑛, respectively; then (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) is
viewed as a candidate when it holds for all 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑚 − 𝑛.
Experiments indicate that this step can indeed determine
the unique correct (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) at most times, and output a few
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Table 1: Experimental results.
Parameter Time for Step 1 Time for Step 2 Time for attack Determining unique (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) Success rate
ParaA 0.61 s 1.94 s 2.55 s 67% 100%
ParaB 0.60 s 1.86 s 2.46 s 71% 100%
Table 2: Experimental results for optimized attack.
Parameter Time for Step 1 Time for Step 2 Time for attack Success rate
ParaA 0.57 s 1.14 s 1.71 s 100%
ParaB 0.57 s 1.14 s 1.71 s 100%
candidates (including the correct pair) of the form (𝜆 ⋅ 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝)
for small factor 𝜆 at other times. Therefore, by guessing 𝑠𝑘
and 𝑝, we can actually remove the secret scaling factor and
transform PK into a standard Compact-LWE sample.
Step 2 (recovering the plaintext). After the previous step, we
obtain one or more (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) pairs. Next, we are to show how to
recover the plaintext combined with the ciphertext.
Let B = (b1, . . . , b𝑚) be the basis ofL𝑞(A) described in
Lemma 6. Given a candidate pair of the mask coefficient(𝑠𝑘󸀠, 𝑝󸀠) = (𝜆 ⋅ 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) where 𝜆 is small, let pk󸀠 = 𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ 𝑝−1𝑞 ⋅
pk mod 𝑞. Running Babai’s algorithm on L𝑞(A) and target
vector pk󸀠, we obtain k󸀠 ∈ L𝑞(A) and let e󸀠 = k󸀠 − pk󸀠. We
observe that the distance from pk󸀠 toL𝑞(A) is at most ‖𝜆 ⋅e‖,
and ‖𝜆⋅e‖ ≤ 𝜆⋅𝑟√𝑚 < (1/2)‖b∗𝑖 ‖ for 𝑛+1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚. Following
a similar argument of (16) in Theorem 11, we know that
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩e󸀠󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2 ≤ ‖𝜆 ⋅ e‖2 + 𝑛4max1≤𝑖≤𝑛 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩b∗𝑖 󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩2 ≤ (𝜆2𝑟2 + 𝑛4𝑏2)𝑚. (22)
Let s󸀠 ∈ Z𝑚𝑞 such that k󸀠 = 𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅𝑝−1𝑞 As󸀠 mod 𝑞, thenpk = As󸀠−𝑠𝑘󸀠−1𝑞 ⋅ 𝑝󸀠 ⋅ e󸀠 mod 𝑞 where 𝑠𝑘󸀠−1𝑞 ⋅ 𝑠𝑘󸀠𝑞 = 1 mod 𝑞. Exploiting
the substitute secret key (𝑠𝑘󸀠, 𝑝󸀠, s󸀠, e󸀠), we can decrypt the
ciphertext c = (a, 𝑥) as follows:
(1) Calculate 𝑐󸀠 = [⟨a, s󸀠⟩ + 𝑥]𝑞.
(2) Calculate 𝑠𝑘V󸀠 = ⌊𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ 𝑐󸀠⌉𝑞.
(3) Return V󸀠 = [𝑠𝑘󸀠−1𝑝 ⋅𝑠𝑘V󸀠]𝑝 where 𝑠𝑘󸀠−1𝑝 ⋅𝑠𝑘󸀠 = 1 mod 𝑝.
We now explain why the ciphertext can be decrypted
correctly by above algorithm. It can be checked that 𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ 𝑐󸀠 =𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ V+𝑝󸀠∑𝑤𝑗=1 𝑒󸀠𝑖𝑗 mod 𝑞. Noticing that ‖e󸀠‖ is well-bounded
and some coordinates 𝑒󸀠𝑖 of e󸀠 could be negative, wemay assert
that 𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ V + 𝑝󸀠∑𝑤𝑗=1 𝑒󸀠𝑖𝑗 ∈ (−𝑞/2, 𝑞/2) with a high probability.
Thus the term 𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ V + 𝑝󸀠∑𝑤𝑗=1 𝑒󸀠𝑖𝑗 can be recovered (as 𝑠𝑘V󸀠)
correctly, which implies that V󸀠 is the plaintext.
Experiments show that the plaintext can indeed be
recovered, even if (𝑠𝑘󸀠, 𝑝󸀠) = (𝜆 ⋅ 𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) for some 𝜆 ̸= 1.
When 𝜆 is large, the norm of e󸀠 may exceed the upper bound𝑟√𝑚, which implies that (𝑠𝑘󸀠, 𝑝󸀠) is a wrong guess.Therefore,
we may eliminate some wrong guesses of (𝑠𝑘󸀠, 𝑝󸀠) further in
this step.Moreover, onemay also trymoremiddle terms such
as 𝑠𝑘V󸀠 = ⌊𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ 𝑐󸀠⌉𝑞, ⌊𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ 𝑐󸀠⌉𝑞 ± 𝑞 during the “decryption”
to ensure that the correct value of 𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ V + 𝑝󸀠∑𝑤𝑗=1 𝑒󸀠𝑖𝑗 is not
missed. However, from our experimental results, we observe
that trying only one 𝑠𝑘V󸀠 = ⌊𝑠𝑘󸀠 ⋅ 𝑐󸀠⌉𝑞 is enough to recover the
plaintext in practice.
Experimental Results. We implemented our attack using the
NTL library [35]. All experiments were run on a single core
of a 3.40GHz Core i7-4930K PC.
We follow the parameter setting suggested in [25]: the
public parameters (𝑞, 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑤, 𝑏) = (232, 13, 74, 216, 86, 16)
and the secret parameters (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝) = (2𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 2𝑦 + 1). We
denote the cases (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ [0, 50] × [0, 500] and [0, 500] ×[0, 50] by ParaA and ParaB, respectively. For ParaA and
ParaB, we respectively generated 100 random instances and
calculated the ciphertexts of 100 random messages for each
instance. Then we ran the attack on these 10000 ciphertexts.
Experimental results are given in Table 1.
Asmentioned before, wemay obtain several (𝑠𝑘󸀠, 𝑝󸀠)pairs
in Step 1. In fact, it suffices to take use of the pair with the
minimal 𝑠𝑘󸀠 to recover the plaintext. This observation leads
to an optimization of the attack: one may search (𝑠𝑘󸀠, 𝑝󸀠)
in increasing (dictionary) order and move to Step 2 once a
candidate is found. Experimental results for optimized attack
are given in Table 2.
Comparison with Bootle and Tibouchi’s Attack. We note that
Bootle and Tibouchi also proposed a practical attack [29]
against Liu et al.’s encryption scheme.They deployed the tech-
nique of embedding lattices to compute the nonce sequence𝑖1, . . . , 𝑖𝑤 in encryption process Enc(⋅), while we start from
a different angle and recover a substitutable tuple of private
keys (𝑠𝑘󸀠, 𝑝󸀠, s󸀠, e󸀠). We hold the view that the insecurity of
Liu et al.’s scheme is not only a result of the small value of 𝑛 as
claimed in [29], but also the overstretchedmagnitude relation
between the modulus 𝑞 and parameters 𝑏,𝑚, and 𝑛, which is
clarified inTheorem 11.
4.3. Attack against Galbraith’s Scheme. In [24], Galbraith
proposed a class of LWE-based encryption for constrained
devices with more compact parameters; that is, the public
matrix A is binary. We tried to attack Galbraith’s scheme
exploiting short vectors ofL⊥𝑞 (A) as described before, but it
was ineffective even for the parameters totally broken in [27].
That is because the modulus 𝑞 in Galbraith’s scheme is not so
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overstretched.However, the binary publicmatrix and encryp-
tion nonce may still be problematic as suggested in [27].
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we target the variant of LWE called Compact-
LWE which may be applied to design IoT-oriented
lightweight cryptography. We give an explicit analysis of
Compact-LWE and point out some weak instances with
extreme compactness and overstretchedmoduli. As an appli-
cation of our results, we propose a practical attack against
the lightweight public key scheme in [25]. Consequently, we
claim that the security estimation in [25] is incorrect.
The fragility of the scheme in [25] comes not only from
its small parameters but also from the weak hardness of
Compact-LWE. It would be interesting to generally figure out
a theoretical hardness relation between Compact-LWE and
other lattice problems.
Compact-LWEmay be still of some interest under refined
parameters. We leave to future work the issues of tradeoff
between efficiency and security, in particular the practical
parameter selections achieving given security levels for IoT
devices.
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